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Human beings are unique among species in their ability to cooperate in large groups 
of genetically unrelated individuals, and in this book, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
attempt to account for the origins of this ability. The authors specialize in the use of formal 
models and agent-based simulations in order to precisely specify their theories of 
cooperation, and they often draw on studies conducted in hunter gatherer societies and in 
experimental economic laboratories for evidence that they find relevant to evaluating these 
theories. The book is a valuable review of these anthropological and economic literatures, 
and a thorough showcase of the authors’ expert formal theorizing about how cooperation 
may have evolved. However, I often found myself disagreeing with the authors’ focus on 
group selection as an explanation for human cooperation, and with their views on how well 
the empirical findings provide support for group selectionist theories.  
The authors believe that cooperation is best explained by theories of multi-level 
selection. They do not overlook the individual as a vehicle of selection; their version of 
multi-level selection focuses on both individuals and groups. However, they do not believe 
that human cooperation could have evolved via individual-level adaptation alone, and they 
explain its evolution ultimately in terms of the survival advantages that it brought to whole 
groups. To me it seems premature to resort to the group selectionist aspects of this view. 
It’s possible that a theory that combines group and individual selection will ultimately lead 
to a more predictive science of human cooperation than could be achieved via an 
individual-level adaptationist theory alone. Currently, however, it’s not clear what extra 
predictive power we gain from evoking biological group selection. 
The debate in biology about group selection is not new, of course. As unfashionable 
as group selection became in the decades following the publication of Williams (1966), it 
has been resuscitated to some extent in more recent years (e.g., Wilson and Wilson, 2007). 
Nevertheless, adaptationist researchers in biology and psychology continue to regard 
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individual-level biological adaptation as standard, and group-level biological adaptation as 
extraordinary, and to assume that when there is a conflict between these two levels, the 
individual level will prevail. The individual-level perspective has proven highly predictive 
and productive in human evolutionary psychology, and the same cannot be said—at least 
not yet—for the group-level perspective. That’s why most evolutionary psychologists still 
agree that “adaptation should be attributed to no higher a level of organization than is 
demanded by the evidence” (Williams, 1966, p. v). 
Does the evidence of human cooperation in groups demand a group selectionist 
explanation? For the most part, it’s not clear that it does, because members of cooperative 
groups generally seem to act in ways that would have been individually-adaptive in 
ancestral environments (Price, 2011; Price and Johnson, 2011). Bowles and Gintis are 
correct, of course, to emphasize the groupishness of humans, and the vital importance of 
group cooperation in human ancestral environments. But contributing to group endeavors is 
a fundamental way in which individuals acquire resources and social status, and these are 
things that obviously promote individual fitness. Bowles and Gintis are also correct to 
focus on war as a selection pressure (they argue that it was a key force of intergroup 
selection), but this emphasis is equally compatible with the individual-level view; 
individual-level adaptationists have been interested in war since the early days of modern 
human behavioral biology (Alexander, 1979; Chagnon and Bugos, 1979; Symons, 1979). 
The view that group selection is needed to explain most human cooperation seems 
inconsistent with the fact that over the past several decades, most successful research on 
this cooperation has theorized that it is produced by individual-level adaptations (Price, 
2011; Price and Johnson, 2011). The most influential and predictive theories of group 
cooperation have assumed that people contribute to group efforts in order to acquire 
resources for themselves, and that the main obstacle to successful cooperation is that 
members often do better individually by contributing less, or by consuming more, than 
would be optimal for group success (Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965). These theories have 
served as the basis for an immense body of research which has demonstrated their 
predictive power; a quick overview of this research follows. Individual group members 
tend to acquire return benefits via their cooperation, by engaging in behaviors that can be 
regarded as n-person reciprocity or conditional cooperation (Fischbacher, Gaechter, and 
Fehr, 2001; Tooby, Cosmides, and Price, 2006), competitive altruism (Hardy and Van 
Vugt, 2006; Roberts, 1998), and status-for-altruism transactions (Price, 2003, 2006); they 
free ride frequently, when they can get away with it (Fehr and Gaechter, 2000); they 
monitor other members’ contribution levels so that they can detect and punish free riding 
(Ostrom, 1990; Price, 2006), and they experience more punitive sentiment towards free 
riders when they are more individually vulnerable to being free ridden (Price, 2005; Price, 
Cosmides, and Tooby, 2002); they engage in partner choice, which allows highly 
cooperative individuals to assort positively and thus avoid being exploited by free riders 
(Barclay and Willer, 2007; Page, Putterman and Unel, 2005); and they engage in more 
cooperation and third party punishment when they can acquire more reputational benefits 
from doing so, or when they detect cues that their actions are being monitored (Bateson, 
Nettle, and Roberts, 2006; Kurzban, DeScioli, and O’Brien, 2007; Milinski, Semmann, and 
Krambeck, 2002). 
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Bowles and Gintis’ main argument for the predictive inadequacy of individual 
selection is based on experimental game results which demonstrate that participants 
continue to cooperate to some extent, even after experimenters have attempted to eliminate 
all individual-level benefits (e.g., by organizing a game that, because it is anonymous and 
one shot, rules out direct and indirect reciprocity). The main problem with this suggestion 
has been pointed out repeatedly (Trivers, 2004; Burnham and Johnson, 2005; Hagen and 
Hammerstein, 2006; Price, 2008): Experimental economic games are not ecologically valid 
contexts from which to draw conclusions about how humans are adapted for one-shot, 
“anonymous” social activity. One-shot games are easy enough to orchestrate in 
experimental labs, but what would the analogue be in ancestral environments? Ancestrally, 
no experimenter was present to enforce the one-shot nature of an interaction, so social 
interactions were intrinsically iterative; for instance, if you cheated somebody, he might 
retaliate (Trivers, 2004). There’s no real reason, therefore, to expect the human mind to be 
adapted to a one-shot interaction context, or to process such experimental interactions as if 
they were truly one-shot. Further, for a behavior to be perceived as anonymous in the 
ancestral past, the actor would need to feel sure that no one else could consciously observe 
the act (e.g., she would need to be alone in the middle of the forest). This is nothing at all 
like the environment of an experimental lab, where you may be surrounded by other 
participants, you believe you are interacting with other conscious participants, and you 
know that your behavior is being recorded and scrutinized by researchers. Even if a 
participant consciously believes that his behavior is anonymous, his semi-autonomous 
adaptations producing his cooperative behavior may not act as if they believe this.  
In sum, results from experimental economics games can be highly illuminating and 
useful for many purposes, but just like any kind of behavioral data, they have limitations. It 
is doubtful that experimental economic results actually reveal much of anything about how 
people are adapted for one-shot anonymous interactions, and they should not be regarded as 
evidence about the relevance of the individual as a vehicle of selection in ancestral 
environments.  
I also found myself a little distracted by what seemed like moralistic overtones in 
the book’s prose style. For instance: “The moral, generous, and civic-minded 
predispositions documented… in the pages that follow show that evolution can not only 
foster self-interest but also promote the generous and ethical behaviors that help us escape 
the prisoner’s dilemma and avert the tragedy of the commons, and that permit us to sustain 
the hope for a society committed to freedom and justice for all” (p. 7). The message seems 
to be that “self-interest” (or more accurately, adaptations designed to promote individual 
fitness) could never lead to such desirable outcomes as generosity, ethical behavior, 
freedom, and justice; therefore, unless we want to claim that such great things are 
impossible or illusory, we had better accept a group selectionist view. One problem here is 
that all such virtues are in fact entirely compatible with individual-level theories of 
cooperation (e.g., reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, n-person reciprocity, partner 
choice and positive assortment, costly signaling), and there’s no good reason for suggesting 
otherwise. Another problem is that the language used by Bowles and Gintis seems to imply, 
inappropriately, a kind of moral obligation on the part of the reader to accept the group 
selectionist view. 
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In summary, the book is valuable both as a review of the anthropological and 
economic literatures on cooperative behavior, and as an impressive collection of formal 
models for how such behavior may in theory have evolved. But we have to remind 
ourselves that formal models are just as theoretical as verbal models. People sometimes 
seem to treat the output of formal models as data in and of itself, and to overlook that the 
data we are actually trying to predict are those describing the cooperative psychology of 
real humans. To the extent that any formal model allows us to make unique, accurate 
predictions about this psychology—under ecologically valid circumstances—it should be 
regarded as indispensible. For the time being, however, individual-level theories seem to 
outshine group selection when it comes to illuminating human biological adaptations for 
cooperation. 
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